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ABSOLUTE PRIORITY AND NEW VALUE
JAMES J. WHITE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The absolute priority rule is a specific application of the
broader doctrine that reorganization plans must be "fair and equi-
table." Both have their origins in the railroad reorganization cases
of the early 20th century.' The general doctrine is now codified in
section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code2 and the rule is codified
in subsection 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) which provides that the debtor
must pay a nonconsenting class of unsecured creditors in full or
"the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of
such junior claim or interest any property."3 At least when it is
applied rigorously, this simple rule is a powerful brake on the
debtor's behavior and a strong influence on the negotiation that is
likely to occur over-a reorganization plan.
It means that the shareholders of the debtor - whether a
small closely held company or a large publicly held one - or the
partners of a partnership, cannot keep anything unless they either
pay the unsecured creditors in full or get the agreement of all of
the unsecured creditor classes. Because the rule is a part of
1129(b), it need not be satisfied unless the plan is to be "crammed
down," that is to say, unless there is a class of creditors that has
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. This paper was origi-
nally given on December 6, 1990 as the Second Annual Robert E. Krinock Lecture, Thomas
M. Cooley Law School.
1. See Kansas City Terminal R.R. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445 (1926);
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
2. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1991).
3. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1979 & Supp. 1991).
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not accepted the plan under section 1129(a)(8)(A). Because the
most obvious escape from the rule is to negotiate with the creditor
class that is objecting and thus to procure its acceptance (by a vote
of more than one-half in number and at least two-thirds in
amount) the initial consequence of the rule is to make the debtor
more willing to negotiate, but in fact the rule protects against a
multitude of evils. Assume, for example, that the debtor procures a
particularly persuasive appraiser who appears before a sympathetic
judge and that the appraiser and debtor convince the court that
the value of the property in the bankruptcy estate is much lower
than the creditors believe it to be. But for the absolute priority
rule, the creditors would have no recourse. Being stuck with the
court's finding about the value, the best interest rule in section
1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (promising them only as much as they would get
on a hypothetical liquidation based on the low estimation) would
assure them only a small recovery. With the absolute priority rule,
each class can protect itself by vetoing the plan.
Assume alternatively that the proposed plan uses a present
value discount rate that is unacceptable to the creditors, or that
the plan puts unacceptable contingencies on the payments to be
made under it. Against all of these manipulations stands the abso-
lute priority rule.
Of course, strict application of the absolute priority rule on
behalf of a stubborn, vindictive, or ignorant class of creditors could
forestall what might be the most efficient plan. If, for example, the
debtor was in fact the most efficient operator of the business to be
reorganized and if the reorganization plan would truly produce
more than might be gained on liquidation by the creditors, a stub-
born or ignorant creditor class insisting upon full payment might
cause the debtor to abandon such a plan and so leave all parties in
a worse position than if the plan had been adopted. Perhaps be-
cause of my biases, I believe the former problem (improper debtor
manipulation) is more significant than the latter (creditor igno-
rance and vindictiveness), but I understand that others could come
to different conclusions.
This wall, the absolute priority rule, has protected reorganiza-
tion creditors quite effectively against debtor onslaught for nearly
eighty years. In the past decade, however, debtors have success-
fully breached the wall in a handful of cases under the banner of
"new value." In these cases, the junior claimants (usually share-
holders of a debtor corporation or partners of a debtor partner-
ship) have argued that they may retain a stake in the reorganized
company without making full payment to nonconsenting creditor
classes because they are contributing "new value" and thus are not
merely junior claimants "retaining" their interest "on account of
[Vol. 8:1
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such junior claim." Whether the wall can be repaired against this
attack, or whether it will be routinely and continuously subject to
breach because of the new value rule, remains to be seen. Some
courts embrace the new value exception while others completely
deny its validity.
II. HISTORY OF THE NEW VALUE EXCEPTION
The doctrine that a reorganization must be "fair and equita-
ble" was itself originally a judge-made rule. It is commonly traced
to the case of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd.4 Boyd was a
creditor of the original railroad that had gone through an equity
reorganization. In that reorganization, the old bondholders and
stockholders, mostly the same people, used the reorganization in
effect to "squeeze out" the intermediate unsecured debt. Because
the senior creditors and the shareholders were the same people, the
senior creditors' agreement to a plan that favored the shareholders
said nothing about its fairness to creditors who were not also
shareholders. Ultimately Boyd, a squeezed intermediate creditor,
won in a Supreme Court decision that established that such a
squeeze out was impermissible because it was not "fair and
equitable."
Professor Ayer has described the next major set of Supreme
Court developments, those occurring shortly before World War II,
as follows:
That was the situation as it stood when the Supreme Court de-
cided Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. in 1939. The facts
of Case are simple: the debtor holding company had liabilities of
$3.8 million and held a subsidiary that owned the Los Angeles Ship-
yard and Drydock - an asset valued at $830,000. The plan Was to
cancel old securities and issue new ones in their place. Some twenty-
three percent of the new securities would go to the former stock-
holders. Both lower courts confirmed the plan, but a unanimous Su-
preme Court reversed.
The case is both historically and doctrinally important. In terms
of political history, the case marks a milestone in the career of Jus-
tice William 0. Douglas, who wrote the opinion for the unanimous
Court. Douglas had served on the Court less than a year at the time
of the decision, having come from the chairmanship of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. At the SEC, he was one of the principal
architects of the New Deal corporate law reforms, and one of the
authors of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. His opinion adopts
much of the substance of an amicus brief filed by the SEC.
As an instance of decisionmaking strategy, the case is notewor-
4. 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
19911
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thy because it is the first major absolute priority case in which the
Court interprets a statute. And indeed, Justice Douglas' interpreta-
tion has become so rooted in the culture of the law that it is a sur-
prise to note just how attenuated it is. For the statute - Bank-
ruptcy Act, section 77B, the precursor of Chapter X - nowhere
states that claims must be paid by a principle of absolute priority.
Instead, Justice Douglas deploys a provision in subsection (f), which
provides that a plan must be "fair and equitable." These words, Jus-
tice Douglas writes, "are words of art which prior to the advent of
Section 77B had acquired a fixed meaning through judicial interpre-
tations in the field of equity receivership reorganizations." Strictly
speaking, this is poppycock, and Justice Douglas knew it.. None of
the Supreme Court's absolute priority cases used that particular
phrase in that particular way. Indeed, Justice Douglas himself cites
only one prior use of the term in case law, and that is in an appel-
late opinion which the Supreme Court later overturned. On the
other hand, the question was at least open, and it was reasonable to
infer that the drafters intended to import at least some kind of ab-
solute priority rule into Section 77B.
But what kind of rule? Substantively, the remarkable fact about
Case is that over ninety percent of all bondholders had accepted the
plan. Justice Douglas held that this fact was "immaterial on the ba-
sic issue of its fairness." The only possible inference was that this
time, the Supreme Court meant business.
Case interpreted old Section 77B, already superseded before the
Supreme Court issued its opinion. But the Court soon made clear
that the "fair and equitable" language also applied under the super-
seding Chapter X. The Court also articulated one further principle
necessary to make the absolute priority rule work in practice. Thus,
in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, the Court held that
in order to apply the absolute priority rule, a finding as to the value
of the reorganized enterprise must be made. On reflection, this
seems obvious. If the creditors hold claims worth $10 and the debtor
is worth $8, then it violates the absolute priority rule to leave any
interest with the debtor; if the debtor is worth $12, then it does not.
Nevertheless, this obvious truth seems to have eluded a number of
earlier courts. Consolidated Rock Products also established that the
criterion of "value" for purposes of the rule was not merely the
value of the enterprise in liquidation. Rather, it was the (presuma-
bly higher) value of the business as a going concern.5
In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co.,' Justice Douglas rejected
the argument of the old shareholders who sought to receive shares
of the reorganized corporation; these shareholders had argued that
their "familiarity with the operation of the business" and financial
5. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 974-76
(1989) (footnotes omitted).
6. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
[Vol. 8:1
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standing and influence constituted new value that would entitle
them to shares in the new corporation. Nevertheless, Justice Doug-
las stated in dictum that payment of proper "new value" would
entitle the shareholders to a piece of the reorganized company.. He
found it "clear that there are circumstances under which stock-
holders may participate in a plan of reorganization of an insolvent
debtor."' 7 He noted that the old stockholders could share where
there was "necessity ... [to make] a fresh contribution and receive
in return a participation reasonably equivalent to their contribu-
tion .. ."8 Of course, all of this was dictum for the holding rejected
the plan as violating the absolute priority rule. Justice Douglas
quoted at length from and relied upon the earlier and confusing
Supreme Court case of Kansas City Terminal Railway Co. v. Cen-
tral Union Trust Co.9 That case permitted a plan under which a
creditor would receive certain securities of the new corporation and
shareholders would receive similar securities only. if they paid a
specific assessment. Professor Ayer summarizes the case as follows:
The gist of this analysis is that Justice McReynolds' opinion in
Kansas City Terminal, while it does indeed contain intimations of
an absolute priority rule and also of a new value exception, is equiv-
ocal at best, and can be read as supporting something quite differ-
ent. All this is captious or fanciful in the absence of evidence that
the opinion was actually (mis)read this way. Fortunately, evidence
was already at hand in the interpretation by the lower court on re-
mand, approving a revised reorganization plan. The plan allocated
value to all classes, including equity. Since neither absolute priority
nor its recently-hatched new value corollary guided the Court, the
governing principles of the case are obscure. There was no pretense
of a valuation, no pretense of an allocation of value in terms of
claims, and no pretense that shareholders were being compensated
according to their contribution. The plan was simply confirmed, and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The point of all this is that neither of the cases taken as semi-
nal for the new value doctrine can be read as an application of the
new value doctrine. Kansas City Terminal "states" it, but in a self-
contradictory manner, and accepts the ruling of the lower court
when that court chose not to apply it. Case "states" it well enough
(indeed, one is tempted to say that Justice Douglas understood Jus-
tice McReynolds' opinion far better than Justice McReynolds un-
derstood it himself) but then refuses to apply it on the particular
facts. ' °
7. Id. at 121.
8. Id.
9. 271 U.S. 445 (1926).
10. Ayer, supra note 4, at 1006-07 (footnotes omitted).
1991]
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III. THE NEW VALUE EXCEPTION AFTER 1978
The next event in the history of the new value exception is the
passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.11 As we see above,
the absolute priority rule for the first time appears in section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Code. What started as a rule of equity in
Boyd, and cases like it, has now become a rule of statutory law
explicitly adopted by Congress. Note, too, that there is no mention
of a new value exception to the absolute priority rule. What infer-
ence does one draw from that? One possibility is illustrated by the
opinion of Bankruptcy Judge Clark in In re Greystone III Joint
Venture. 2 There, Judge Clark finds:
It is fair to assume that Congress was aware of Case when it passed
the Bankruptcy Code. That Congress did not expressly codify Case's
holding should be of no moment, as the term of art carried with it
the judicial glosses that had been placed upon it .... It is a time-
honored principle of statutory construction that legislators are pre-
sumed to be aware of judicial glosses placed on prior statutory en-
actments, and that subsequent amendments and codifications are
presumed to have been carried into the new statute unless expressly
repudiated.13
In In re Winters, 4 Judge Bentz draws the opposite inference.
First, the judge quotes from the House Report that describes the
absolute priority rule's application as follows:
If the debtor is unable to obtain the consents of all classes of credi-
tors and stockholders, then the court may confirm the plan anyway
on the request of the plan's proponent, if the plan treats the non-
consenting classes fairly. The bill defines "fairly" in terms of the
relative rights among the classes. Simply put, the bill requires that
the plan pay any dissenting class in full before any class junior to
the dissenter may be paid at all. The rule is a partial application of
the absolute priority rule now applied under chapter X and requires
a full valuation of the debtor as the absolute priority does under
current law.' 5
Noting that absolute priority is brought into play in the current
law only if the class - as opposed to an individual creditor -
votes against the plan, the court points out that Congress made
several changes in the court-made rule. Judge Bentz then
11. Pub. Law No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11 US.C.A. (West 1979 & Supp. 1991)).
12. 102 Bankr. 560 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
13. Id. at 575 n.20.
14. 99 Bankr. 658 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
15. Id. at 662 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 221-24, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ai)MIN. NEWS 5963, 6181-84) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 8:1
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concludes:
Congress, with apparent deliberation, did not mention the "infusion
of new capital" as a consideration in applying the fair and equitable
test. Thus, the discussion in Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.
about "infusion of new capital" is no longer an element to be consid-
ered a "fair and equitable" issue for confirmation under 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(B).' 6
What does one do in the face of such diametrically opposed
inferences drawn by sensible persons from the same Congressional
enactment? Perhaps neither the language of section 1129 nor the
statutory history gives an unequivocal answer to the Congressional
intention. Whether the "words speak for themselves" in omitting
mention of new value or whether these same words are covered by
the invisible judicial gloss of Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products
Co.,' 7 I do not know. I suspect that the arguments based on the
statutory history are partly reasons given for conclusions already
reached and not syllogistic steps to such conclusions. Not above
rationalizing my own prejudices, I cast my lot with those who find
no new value exception in the language. I am impressed by Judge
Pusateri's point that Congress did not merely invoke the "fair and
equitable standard" but in fact included a series of subsections
that specifically defines the fair and equitable standard in several
circumstances. 18 Having taken one large step beyond a mere state-
ment of the fair and equitable rule by its statement of section
1129(b)(2), why did Congress not go the next small step and spell
out the new value exception if it intended the exception to exist? I
believe that.this omission gives at least a breath of support for the
inference that Congress did not intend the new value exception to
continue.
Additional support for that position rests in the disparate ap-
plication of the fair and equitable standard announced in Boyd (as
codified in section 77B(f) of the Bankruptcy Act) and section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The abso-
lute priority rule is now applicable only when the plan proponent
is seeking a "cramdown" on an impaired class that rejected the
plan. If the requisite majority of creditors (at least two-thirds in
amount and more than one-half in number, section 1126(c)) in
each class has accepted the plan, then the plan can be approved
even though some junior parties take and some senior parties are
not paid. The absolute priority rule does not apply. In contrast,
16. Id. at 663 (citation omitted); accord In re Drimmel, 108 Bankr. 284 (D. Kan.
1989).
17. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
18. In re Drimmel, 108 Bankr. 284, 289 (D. Kan. 1989).
1991]
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confirmation under section 77B(f) required class approval and
compliance with the fair and equitable standard (including the ab-
solute priority rule).
When one considers the "new value" exception to the absolute
priority rule, this distinction is important. Since the absolute pri-
ority rule was a threshold condition for confirmation of any plan
under section 77B(f), the judge-made "new value" exception found
in Case gave plan proponents some leverage when dealing with an
obstinate minority of creditors who could otherwise block
confirmation. 9
Today, obstinate inflexible minority creditors within an ac-
cepting class cannot demand plan compliance with the absolute
priority rule, for section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) applies only when the
class as a whole has rejected the plan. Thus, to the extent one
views the new value exception as a means of silencing minority
creditors within an accepting class, there is no longer any need for
such an exception under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
given the revised confirmation standard of section 1129.20
There is one additional statutory argument for the new value
exception. This is the argument based upon the prepositional
phrase "on account of such junior claim" that appears at the end
of the absolute priority rule quoted above. It states that the equity
holder cannot retain any interest "on account of such junior
claim." Could that equity holder retain an interest "on account of"
new value that was contributed?2' To the extent that current eq-
uity holders are able to retain interests in existing reorganized cor-
porations because only they can propose plans under 1121's exclu-
sivity rule or because of insiders' knowledge of the reorganized
corporation, they are receiving a benefit "on account of such junior
claim or interest." It is their very status as the debtor in possession
that entitles them to the exclusivity period (holding competitors at
bay) and that grants them the knowledge sufficient to make a plan.
Thus, with Judge Pusateri, 2 I find the statutory argument based
on the preposition (on account of) not persuasive.
Since 1978, the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits have applied
the new value exception.2' Both assume and neither questions the
19. The Supreme Court noted that the "new value" would be used "not only to pro-
vide new working capital but also to pay dissenting creditors." Case, 308 U.S. at 121 n.15.
Minority creditors are those creditors within an accepting class which have rejected the plan
(less than two-thirds in amount and no more than one-half in number in their class).
20. It is important to note that if Case were decided today under § 1129 then the plan
would have been confirmed since over 90 percent of the objecting creditors' class had ac-
cepted the plan.
21. That argument is made in In re Snyder, 99 Bankr. 885 (S.D. Ill. 1989).
22. Drimmel, 108 Bankr. at 290.
23. In re U.S. Truck .Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Potter Material
[Vol. 8:1
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existence of the exception. In a recent Seventh Circuit case,24
Judge Posner has made clear that the earlier Seventh Circuit ap-
plication of the new value exception in In re Potter Material Ser-
vice, Inc. 5 should not be read to bind the Seventh Circuit to that
position. "We emphasize, however, that the issue is an open one in
this circuit, Potter notwithstanding. A point of law merely as-
sumed in an opinion, not discussed, is not authoritative."2 Thus,
even though two circuits appear to embrace the new value excep-
tion as having continued existence after 1978, they are weak au-
thority for that position since the existence was assumed in both
cases and not contested in either.
The court of appeals' decisions are yet less persuasive than
they might otherwise be because they were both decided prior to
the Supreme Court decision in Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ahlers.27 In Ahlers, the Court held that "sweat equity" - the ad-
dition of extra labor - is not sufficient to satisfy the new value
requirement, assuming arguendo that the new value exception ex-
ists.28 In an amicus brief in that case, the Solicitor General had
argued that the new value exception did not survive the 1978 en-
actment and urged the Court to decide the case on that basis. The
Court declines that offer, but it makes clear that one should not
draw an inference that the new value exception continues to exist
from its refusal to deny its existence:
Thus, our decision today should not be taken as any comment on
the continuing vitality of the Los Angeles Lumber exception - a
question which has divided the lower courts since passage of the
Code in 1978. Rather, we simply conclude that even if an "infusion-
of-'money-or-money's-worth'" exception to the absolute priority
rule has survived the enactment of 1129(b), respondents' proposed
contribution to the reorganization plan is inadequate to gain the
benefit of this exception."
IV. APPLYING THE RULE
Assuming, arguendo, that the rule lives, how does one apply
Serv., Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986); cf. In re Anderson, 913 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1990)
(proposed reorganization with $5000 additional capital was insufficient to invoke the new
value exception for farming business).
24. In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2,
Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., rejecting new
value on facts of that case). '
25. 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986).
26. Stegall, 865 F.2d at 142.
27. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
28. Id. at 204.
29. Id. at 203 n.3 (citations omitted).
1991]
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it?
Because the new value rule is not codified and must, therefore,
be drawn from language of several Supreme Court cases, the pre-
cise shape of the rule is uncertain. When reading Justice Douglas'
dictum in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 30 most find three re-
quirements for the new value rule to be satisfied. First, the new
value must be given in cash or something roughly equivalent to
cash. Second, the new value must be a "necessity" for reorganiza-
tion, and third, the payment must be roughly equivalent to the
going-concern value of the business. Since Justice Douglas held
that the proposal in Case did not meet the new value test, we can
only guess from his opinion what would meet it.
The requirement that any new value be contributed in the
form of cash or something equivalent to cash has real bite. Part of
the reason Justice Douglas rejected the proposal in Case was that
the new value was to be composed in part of the connections and
business acumen of the existing shareholders. More than any of
the other Case requirements, that one stands on a firm footing.
It has been further strengthened in the Supreme Court's 1989
decision in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers3 1 and by a recent
decision of Judge Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit.32 In effect,
the Ahlers suggested that they would add new value that would go
to the benefit of the creditors by working longer hours or more
productively than they would otherwise work. By its reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the Su-
preme Court flatly rejected sweat equity as satisfying the new
value exception.
Several decisions have accepted shareholders' or managers'
guarantees as contributions of new value to the plan. In Kham &
Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting,3 3 Judge Easter-
brook rejected the guarantee of the debtor's obligation as a contri-
bution of new value. In that decision, he concluded that Ahlers by
implication also rejected such a contribution. He analogized the
contribution of new value to the purchase of stock in an existing
corporation and pointed out that under Illinois law, one could not
purchase new stock by promising to perform services. Moreover, he
noted that the guarantee of a shareholder is of uncertain value (for
it depends upon the creditworthiness of the guarantor) and that it
does not become an asset on the balance sheet of the debtor nor is
it alienable. All of these factors make its value uncertain. A guar-
30. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
31. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
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antee lacks many of the usual characteristics of an asset that might
be used as collateral, be sold to raise money or form the basis of
the satisfaction of a debt.
The combination of Justice Douglas's original decision with
Ahlers and cases like Kham & Nate shows that the courts are seri-
ous in requiring money or money's worth and that they will not
accept assets of indeterminate or uncertain value or assets that
have significant limitations on their alienability.
The second requirement - that the new value coming from
the shareholders be a "necessity" - does not carry a clear mes-
sage. What is "necessary"? First, a payment from the shareholders
could be necessary because no others will pay the same amount.
Yet that hardly seems to fit the conventional meaning of the word.
Second, the payment could be necessary: (1) because no one else
would pay any amount, and (2) if there is no payment, the debtor
will have to be liquidated. Of course, that idea is inconsistent with
the thought that there is a going-concern value that is to be pro-
tected by the reorganization and that would otherwise be lost on a
liquidation. How can one say there is a going-concern value when
no one but the existing shareholders will make any payment for it?
To the extent that "necessity" means that liquidation will oc-
cur unless there is a capital contribution to pay existing creditors
(suppliers and such), the necessity requirement is itself in conflict
with other ideas in the new value rule. Let me explain. If, as
Professors Baird and Jackson have argued34 and as Judge Easter-
brook has held,35 the existing creditors are to be treated as "own-
ers" and the new value is to be treated as a "purchase" of the com-
pany from them as the owners, that payment should go into the
pocket of those creditors. If instead of going into their pockets, it is
to be used as working capital of the debtor, ultimately paid out to
other existing and new creditors for current operations, it cannot
properly be regarded as a payment to the existing creditors for the
going-concern value "owned" by them. Thus, to the extent that the
necessity requirement carries the implication of a need for a quick
capital infusion to be paid out to new and existing trade creditors,
it conflicts with the most sophisticated articulation of the rule,
namely, that the new value is a purchase of the company from the
existing creditors.
If the necessity requirement is to have any meaning and prac-
tical application, it is not exactly clear how it is to be applied. Per-
34. Baird & Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute
Priority Rule, 55 U. Cmi. L. REv. 738 (1988).
35. Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1360-63.
1991]
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haps the court in In re Jartran"6 is talking about this requirement
when it recites how parties have attempted over a period of time to
sell the company and that no one but the shareholders were willing
to bid for it. If that is the meaning, then cases like Greystone
37
violate the necessity requirement, for in that case Judge Clark ex-
plicitly states that he is not going to conduct an auction for the
company and implicitly states that he is going to prefer the ex-
isting shareholders' plan over the secured creditor's plan by al-
lowing the exclusivity period to bar the secured creditors from
presenting a competing bid.
In summary, I am doubtful about the meaning of the necessity
requirement. Perhaps it should be disregarded. It may simply have
been Justice Douglas' admonition in Case to other courts that the
new value exception should be rarely applied and that normally
one would expect the shareholders to be wiped out and for others
to own the company after the reorganization.
Third, the new value given must roughly equal the going-con-
cern value of the business. In Jartran,38 the court uses the testi-
mony of several sophisticated financial analysts to determine the
going-concern value of the business and thus to decide whether the
contribution of the shareholders equals this value. In other cases,
the courts are less true to this rule and sometimes simply state
there is no going concern and therefore anything to be paid equals
or exceeds it.
39
It is ironic that this portion of the new value exception invites
the court to make the very error that the fair and equitable doc-
trine is designed to protect against. That is, a principal reason for
the fair and equitable doctrine is to keep the courts from making
unfairly low valuations of the assets and so undermining the rights
of the creditors. Yet, here, we return to the same forum to ask for
valuation of the same property in applying the new value
exception.
I believe that the third requirement is likely to be an empty
rule. Only by arranging for others to investigate the value of the
concern and allowing them to bid against the shareholders on a
fair basis is one likely to determine the true going-concern value.
Even experts as sophisticated as those in Jartran can make only
36. 44 Bankr. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
37. In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 Bankr. 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
38. 44 Bankr. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
39. In're Aztec Co., 107 Bankr. 585 (M.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Greystone III Joint Ven-
ture, 102 Bankr. 560 (W.D. Tex. 1989); In re Jartran, 44 Bankr. 331 (N.D. Il1. 1984); In re
Landau Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (W.D. Mo. 1981); In re Marston Enter., Inc., 13 Bankr. 514
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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educated guesses. 0
As one sees when he reads the cases discussed below, the three
rules distilled from Case- do little to inspire confidence (at least in
a mildly skeptical observer) that the new value exception will not
tear a large hole in the fair and equitable rule and will not invite
exactly the abuses that the fair and equitable rule is to prevent. On
the other hand, some of the cases show reasons why the rule might
help to produce efficiencies that could not otherwise be achieved.
V. THE CASES
The cases, decided by the courts under the 1978 Code, can be
divided chronologically or by representative fact pattern.41 Chrono-
logically, Ahlers may be a milestone. Remember that Ahlers was
the Supreme Court's reversal of a decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit. The court of appeals decision was the
warmest embrace ever given to the new value rule by a court after
1978. Both of the other court of appeals decisions that approved
plans based upon the new value exception also preceded Ahlers.
40. If one read into the going concern equivalence requirement the implication that
value should go into the hands of the "owning creditors," and should not be used for contin-
uing operation of the business, there might be some bite to the requirement. The objection
of the Supreme Court in Ahlers and of Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit in Kham
& Nate's Shoes to "certain payments" as new value might ultimately rest on the proposition
that these are not new value not because they are not new value to the debtor, but because
they are not payments to the existing creditors as a purchase for their rights in the com-
pany. If, ultimately that is the interpretation placed on Ahlers and Kham & Nate's Shoes
and by them upon the third requirement, it will have clarified the law and produced a desir-
able outcome.
41. I have found 16 cases that deal at length ,kith the new value exception. Doubtless I
have missed some, and there are many others that mention the exception in passing. I have
divided the cases into four categories. The first category includes those cases which have
accepted the existence of the new value exception and have applied it. Second are cases that
accept the proposition but, for one reason or another, do not approve the debtor's plan.
Third are cases that do not accept the plan and express doubt about the continuing vitality
of the rule. The final category of cases do not accept the plan and find that the new value
exception did not survive the 1978 enactment of the Code.
Accepted and applied: In re U.S. Truck Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986); In re
Potter Material Serv., Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Greystone III Joint Venture,
102 Bankr. 560 (W.D. Tex. 1989); In re Jartran, 44 Bankr. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1984); In re Landau
Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
New value exception accepted but not applied: In re Mortgage Invest. Co. of El Paso,
111 Bankr. 604 (W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc., 107 Bankr. 909 (N.D.
11. 1989); In re Aztec Co., 107 Bankr. 585 (M.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Sawmill Hydraulics,
Inc., 72 Bankr. 454 (C.D. IlI. 1987); In re Marston Enter., Inc., 13 Bankr. 514 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
New value exception not applied and doubt expressed about its vitality: Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988); Kham & Nate's Shoes No., 2 Inc. v. First Bank
of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1989); In re
Ashton, 107 Bankr. 670 (D.N.D. 1989).
New value exception abolished by the Congressional enactment of the 1978 Code: In re
Drimmel, 108 Bankr. 284 (D. Kan. 1989); In re Winters, 99 Bankr. 658 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
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Neither those cases, nor any of the bankruptcy cases decided prior
to Ahlers, gave careful consideration to the possibility that the
passage of the Code in 1978 had abolished the exception. Most
courts addressed only the question of whether the terms of the
plan before it satisfied the requirements of Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Co.2 In effect, these courts assumed - as presumably the
lawyers had assumed - that the new value exception continued to
exist.
As indicated above, the Justice Department amicus brief in
Ahlers argued that the new value exception had been extinguished
by the passage of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. The Supreme
Court explicitly refused to address that question and stated that
one should not infer from its refusal either that the exception lived
or that it died in 1978. The Supreme Court's response to the ques-
tions raised by the Justice Department alerted the lawyers and the
courts to the possibility that the new value exception had been re-
pealed and, as we see above, some lower courts have since held the
exception did not survive the 1978 Code.
By striking down a particular application of the new value ex-
ception, Ahlers also caused courts to be more critical about the
kind of contribution by the shareholders that could be recognized
as new value. If the farmer's sweat equity was not new value, what
did that tell about guarantees by the shareholder, payment of law-
yers' fees and other debts or promises of future payment to new
creditors of the existing business? Representative of these latter
cases, that not only show skepticism about the continued existence
of the exception but also restrict the kind of contribution that con-
stituted new value, was Judge Easterbrook's decision in Kham &
Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting.4" It is possible
42. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
43. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990). There Judge Easterbrook commented as follows on
the exception:
Bank asks us to hold that the new value exception vanished in 1978. We stop
short of the precipice, as the Supreme Court did in Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 203-04 n.3, for
two reasons: first, the consideration for the shares is insufficient even if the new value
exception retains vitality; second, although Bank vigorously argues the merits of the
new value exception in this court, it did not make this argument in the bankruptcy
court. Despite Bank's failure to preserve its argument, the history and limits of the
rule before 1978 are pertinent to our analysis because, as the Court held in Ahlers,
485 U.S. at 205-06, at a minimum the Code forbids any expansion of the exception
beyond the limits recognized in Case.
Case rejected the argument that continuity of management plus financial stand-
ing that would attract new investment is "new value". According to the Court, only
an infusion of capital in "money or money's worth" suffices. Ahlers reinforces the
message, holding that a promise of future labor, coupled with the managers' experi-
ence and expertise, also is not new value. It remarked that the promises of the man-
agers in Case "[n]o doubt . .. had 'value' and would have been of some benefit to any
reorganized enterprise. But ultimately, as the Court said . . . , 'It]hey reflect merely
[Vol. 8:1
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that we have seen the high point of the new value exception. Sub-
sequent cases in the lower courts or in the Supreme Court may
find that the exception did not survive the 1978 enactment. At
minimum, the Ahlers decision has caused a searching skepticism in
the lower courts about the meaning of the rule and the modes of
satisfying it.
As a basis for considering the justifications for the rule, con-
sider the facts of four cases in which the shareholders or partners
proposed plans based on the application of the rule. In all four of
these cases, the courts found the rule was applicable and satisfied,
but in one of them the court rejected the plan for other reasons.
Here, I mean to direct the reader's consideration to the appli-
cation of the rule to specific and generic sets of facts. The first two
cases, Greystone44 and Marston,45 are known in the bankruptcy
vague hopes or possibilities.' The same is true of respondents' pledge of future labor
and management skills." 485 U.S. at 204 (citations omitted). The Court observed,
ibid., again quoting from Case, that the promise was "intangible, inalienable, and, in
all likelihood, unenforceable. It 'has no place in the asset column of the balance sheet
of the new [entity].' "
Guarantees are no different. 'They are intangible, inalienable, and unenforceable
by the firm. Beard and Parker may revoke their guarantees or render them valueless
by disposing of their assets; although a lender may be able to protest the revocation,
the debtor cannot compel the guarantor to maintain the pledge in force. Guarantees
have "no place in the asset column" of a balance sheet. We do not know whether
these guarantees have the slightest value, for the record does not reveal whether
Parker and Beard have substantial unencumbered assets that the guarantees would
put at risk. If Beard and Parker were organizing a new firm in Illinois, they could not
issue stock to themselves in exchange for guarantees of loans. Illinois requires the
consideration for shares to be money or other property, or "labor or services actually
performed for the corporation", Ill.Rev.Stat.ch.32 6.30. So Beard and Parker could
subscribe for shares against a promise of labor, but the firm could not issue the shares
until the labor had been performed. A guarantee does not fit into any of the statutory
categories, and there is no reason why it should. One who pays out on a guarantee
becomes the firm's creditor, a priority higher than that of stockholder. A guarantor
who has not paid has no claim against the firm. Promises inadequate to support the
issuance of shares under state law are also inadequate to support the issuance of
shares by a bankruptcy judge over the protest of the creditors, the real owners of the
firm.
Debtor relies on In re Potter Material Service, Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986),
but it does not support the bankruptcy judge's decision. The new value in Potter was
a combination of $34,800 cash plus a guarantee of a $600,000 loan. If Beard and
Parker had contributed substantial 'cash, we would have a case like Potter. They
didn't, and we don't. To the extent Potter implies that a guarantee alone is "new
value", it did not survive Ahlers. Potter observed that the guarantor took an eco-
nomic risk, 781 F.2d at 103. Ahlers holds that detriment to the shareholder does not
amount to "value" to the firm; there must be an infusion of new capital. See John D.
Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority after Ahlers, 87 Mich.L.Rev. 963 (1989). A guar-
antee may be costly to the guarantor, but it is not a balance-sheet asset, and it there-
fore may not be treated as new value. The plan of reorganization should not have
been confirmed over Bank's objection.
Id. at 1362-63 (parallel citations omitted).
44. 102 Bankr. 560 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
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trade as "single asset" cases. In both, the debtor's single asset was
a piece of developed real estate. In Marston, it was an apartment
complex of 184 units; in Greystone, it was a commercial building in
Austin, Texas. The fourth case is Jartran." Jartran lies at the op-
posite end of the complexity spectrum from Greystone and Mar-
ston. It involved the operation of a large, nationwide going-concern
that was operated in Chapter 11 for almost three years by the
purchasing shareholder. Only the third modification of the fifth
plan was approved in Jartran and that case required the negotia-
tion with and the agreement of many different creditors - se-
cured, trade, general unsecured and unsecured holding claims such
as lawsuits. The third case, Potter Material,7 lies somewhere be-
tween the others. Potter was a modest operating business. A con-
trolling shareholder operated the business, proposed the plan and
was the beneficiary of the new value exception. I will first recount
the facts of each of the four cases and then use them as a basis for
considering the theoretical arguments in favor of and against the
new value exception to the absolute priority rule.
A. In re Greystone III Joint Venture"8
In Greystone, the court approved a plan over the objection of
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, the mortgagee on a
commercial building. The plan proposed to give Phoenix the pre-
sent value of the mortgaged premises, and, three cents on the dol-
lar for both the trade debt as well as its $3,475,000 deficiency. The
plan would also pay taxes of more than $108,000 and "assure pay-
ment" of seventy-five percent of the tenants' security deposit
claims. The partners proposed to keep their interest by making a
contribution of $500,000 to the estate. This new value was to be
used to pay the items specified above, including the three percent
dividend to Phoenix. Phoenix objected that the plan was not fair
and equitable.
In finding the new value exception was satisfied, the court re-
jects Phoenix's argument. It makes no findings about the going-
concern value of the partnership. The court notes that Phoenix
had indicated its willingness to pay off the unsecured creditors,
complete the tenant "finish out obligations," but found that it was
not a source of "working capital" because Phoenix would not make
any such payment unless it could take over ownership of the prop-
erty. In a telling footnote, Judge Clark emphatically rejects the
45. 13 Bankr. 514 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
46. 44 Bankr. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
47. 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986).
48. 102 Bankr. 560 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
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theory under which Judge Easterbrook and other commentators
have proceeded, namely, the theory that the existing owners were
"purchasing" the company for the new value and that they have a
right to do so only to the extent that they give greater new value
than others would give. Judge Clark responds to that suggestion as
follows:
It is important to emphasize that, due to the nature of the Case
capital infusion exception, it is inappropriate to approach the prob-
lem as though the ownership of the entire enterprise were up for
sale. That is simply not the issue at all. Instead the question is
whether there is an available source of capital to fund the plan....
In other words, the issue of where to get the cash to make the plan
work is not an opportunity to undermine the plan. Instead, if the
plan fails, then another party in the case with standing may propose
an alternative plan.'9
B. In re Marston Enterprises Inc 5 0
The shareholders 1 proposed to purchase the sole asset of
Marston Enterprises, an apartment complex containing 184 units.
They proposed to pay $900,000 for the complex and to take title to
it. The payment was to go to the holder of the first mortgage for a
mortgage debt of $2,300,000. The unsecured portion of the mort-
gage debt, $1,400,000, was to be discharged with no payment, as
were the claims of other unsecured creditors. The new value appar-
ently constituted the $900,000 together with some other undeter-
mined contribution to future operating expenses allegedly equal to
$300,000 to $400,000. The plan was rejected because the sharehold-
ers had not been clever enough to construct even one class who
would vote for the plan, and thus it did not qualify under section
1129(a)(10). The court in dictum, nevertheless, concluded that the
new value exception had been met and presumably would have ap-
proved the plan but for the failure of an impaired class to vote for
it. Had the plan been approved, the mortgagor would successfully
have written the mortgage down to the amount found by the court
to be the value of the property. Having discharged all of its un-
secured debt with no payment, the debtor would have kept for it-
self the going-concern value, if any, over the $900,000. Here, one
might regard this "value" as a call option on any increase in value
of the real estate.
49. Id. at 577 n.22.
50. 13 Bankr. 514 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
51. The parties were actually shareholders of a co-debtor but were found to be the
"shareholders."
1991]
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C. In re Potter Material Service, Inc.2
In Potter Material, the debtor proposed a payment of three
percent to the unsecured creditors. The controlling shareholder
proposed to keep the equity in the company by guaranteeing cer-
tain debt and by contributing sufficient new value. Twenty thou-
sand of this new value was to pay off the debtor's lawyer for his
representation of the debtor in bankruptcy and the other $14,800
was to fund the three percent payment to the unsecured creditors.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a find-
ing that the new value exception had been satisfied. The court con-
cluded that this payment equalled the going-concern value of the
company. There is no finding whether the going-concern value was
considered in setting the three percent payment to the unsecured
creditors or whether that number was arrived at by determining
liquidation value of the company. In its brief, the creditors' com-
mittee complains that the controlling shareholder had drawn ex-
cessive payments out of the company before the bankruptcy and
argues that he would do so afterwards. In effect, the creditors ar-
gue that the shareholder was taking the going-concern value for
himself in the form of salary and personal expense payments.
D. In re Jartran
53
Jartran Truck and Trailer Rental Company competed with U-
Haul, Ryder Systems, and Hertz in the market for rental of trucks
and of trailers to be pulled by automobiles. Formed in 1978, the
company began having economic difficulties as early as 1980. The
difficulties intensified in 1981 and the owners sought a joint ven-
ture or a buy out partner. Early in 1981, the controlling sharehold-
ers signed a letter of intent to sell the company to Ameribond Se-
curities Associates. That transaction contemplated the sale of a
majority interest for a "capital infusion" of possibly $20 million.
Ultimately, the Ameribond deal fell through. In December of 1981,
the Jartran shareholders struck a deal with Frank B. Hall and Co.,
Inc. Under the terms of the December 31, 1981 agreement, Hall
agreed to purchase most of the shares of Jartran from the various
shareholders. Although Hall acquired the stock on that date, most
of the payments for the stock were deferred and contingent. On
the same day (and presumably at Hall's direction), Jartran filed a
petition under Chapter 11. For approximately three years, Hall ran
the company, negotiated with the creditors and proposed various
Chapter 11 plans. On September 29, 1984, Judge Fisher confirmed
52. 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986).
53. 44 Bankr. 331 (N.D. Il. 1984).
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the third modification of Hall's fifth plan.54 Hall's principal antag-
onist was U-Haul who presumably had various legitimate and per-
haps some illegitimate interests in Jartran's future. In an opinion
of more than eighty pages, Judge Fisher confirmed the plan over a
multitude of objections by U-Haul.
The opinion well demonstrates the complexity of such a plan
and the difficult judgments that have to be made in applying the
best interest rule, the absolute priority rule, and other provisions
of section 1129.
Among other things, U-Haul complained that Hall, as the
principal shareholder, did not meet the new value exception in the
case. 5 Aided by extensive and expert testimony from various fi-
nancial experts, the court makes explicit findings not only about
the liquidation value of the company, but also about its going-con-
cern value and the value of the shareholders' equity. The court ad-
dresses the new value exception as follows:
The Court's estimate of the updated value of shareholders' eq-
uity is negative $18,500,000, being the difference between the
$52,500,000 going concern value and the $71,000,000 value of debt.
Accordingly, one aspect of the Los Angeles Lumber test is satisfied.
Inasmuch as the shareholders' equity is valueless, any contribution
by Hall will necessarily. be equal to or greater than the value of its
100% ownership interest.
The Court further finds that Hall is the most feasible source of
the new capital and that its contribution is necessary to assure the
viability of reorganized Jartran. As explained in greater detail infra
in connection with U-Haul's contentions concerning § 1129(a)(3),
the company was marketed for a substantial period prior to the fil-
ing of the petition herein. Other than the proposed Hall acquisition,
no firm commitment for financing was obtained. Nor has Debtor re-
ceived any such commitments since the filing of the petition on De-
cember 31, 1981. After a review of the entire record, the Court is
satisfied that the Hall contribution is necessary to Jartran's success-
ful reorganization within the purview of the Los Angeles Lumber
decision."
To support its position, the Court notes that debtor engaged
in a "thorough marketing effort, wherein its tax attributes were
disclosed and highlighted. No viable offers materialized other than
that of Hall .... -57
Hall's contribution of new value constituted several million
54. Id.
55. The absence of any discussion of the question whether the new value exception
had survived passage of the 1978 Code suggests that argument was not made by U-Haul.
56. Jartran, 44 Bankr. at 379 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 381.
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dollars of guarantees, a $5,000,000 equity contribution, and a com-
mitment to an investment of $52,000,000 to acquire certain secured
claims. Apparently, the $52,000,000 "investment" was Hall's
purchase of the position of two of the secured creditors, Ford and
Chrysler. In effect, this constituted a $52,000,000 loan to Jartran
by Hall. The court approved the plan.
58
VI. CONCLUSION
Three of the reasons why a creditor would argue for the rejec-
tion of the new value exception are quite clear and not difficult to
understand. Whether one accepts one of these arguments will de-
pend in part upon an empirical judgment. Whether one accepts the
others will depend upon a policy judgment about the role of reor-
ganization. Each of the creditor's arguments has to do with the
bargain that the creditor believes he has made with the debtor and
with the rights that arise out of that bargain.
First and most important, a creditor would argue that broad
application of the new value exception will deprive him of some-
thing that the Supreme Court explicitly and Congress implicitly
have granted to him, namely, a first claim on the going-concern
value of the business. Consider a bar graph like the following.
A
X
Next, assume that the liquidation value is the area marked X and
that the area marked A is the additional going-concern value. Fi-
nally, assume that the claims of the objecting creditor class exceed
the sum of A and X. In such circumstances, the creditors have a
right not merely to the liquidation value under section 1129(a)(7),
but also to the going-concern value. This right was explicitly con-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v.
Du Bois.5 9 None of the cases decided since 1978 dissents from that
proposition; in fact, most of the cases decided since 1978 maintain
that they are giving the creditors the entire going-concern value
even though they are applying the new value exception." They
reach that conclusion by finding that the new value contributed
exceeds the sum of the liquidation value and the going-concern
58. Id. 384 at n.115.
59. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
60. In re U.S. Truck Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Potter Material
Serv., Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 Bankr. 560
(W.D. Tex. 1989); In re Jartran, 44 Bankr. 331 (N.D. Il1. 1984); In re Landau Boat Co., 13
Bankr. 788 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
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value.6'
In these cases, creditors invariably argue one or both of the
following: (1) that the court has undervalued the assets;62 and (2)
that the court has overvalued the debtor's promise of future
payment.6"
This basic creditor argument is about valuation and only
about valuation. This argument rests on the empirical proposition
that Chapter 11 is.an organism constructed by Congress and com-
posed of a debtor with unique and intimate knowledge of the busi-
ness, of debtor's persuasive witnesses concerning value, and of a
judge sympathetic to reorganization at almost any cost. In the
creditor's view, this organism is congenitally required to under-
value the assets, overvalue the debtor's promises, and so to dis-
criminate against the creditor's interests. In response, debtors will
maintain that the courts are objective - or at least not biased in
favor of debtors - and that there is no evidence of systematic un-
dervaluation of assets or overvaluation of promises in any event.
Whether one is persuaded by the creditors' first argument
might depend upon his judgment about the probability of bias in
the valuation process. If one could show that the creditors' claims
are empirically true, namely, that the combination of debtor
knowledge, concentrated debtor interest, and a sympathetic judici-
ary produces an understatement of the true value of the assets or
an overstatement of the value of debtor's promises in a large per-
centage of the cases, it would be easy to side with the creditors and
to conclude that the new value exception should be rejected.
I know of no empirical studies that answer that question. The
only data from which one might draw an inference of bias in favor
of debtors is the fact that debtors are so anxious to buy. Why do
debtors fight so vigorously for the right to pay full value?64
Some might argue that even if the frequency of error in valua-
tion is small, the law should neither be written nor interpreted to
expose the creditors even to such occasional error. One making
such an argument might point to the exclusivity period, to the au-
tomatic stay, and to the other rules that enable the debtor in pos-
session to conduct the business as sufficient weapons in the
61. See, e.g., In re Jartran, 44 Bankr. 331, 367-68 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
62. They will maintain that the debtor's experts are not correct and that the going-
concern value and possibly the liquidation value substantially exceed the number put for-
ward by the debtor.
63. If the plan proposes a payment over time, one must value not only the assets in
cash terms, but also the present value of these promises of future payments. If the court
grants too high a value to these promises, creditors suffer the same consequences as if the
assets are given too little value.
64. For reasons discussed below, I hesitate to draw an inference of bias from that fact.
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debtor's hands.
The creditors' arguments will not end with questions about es-
timation of going-concern value of the business or calculation of
the present value of the debtor's promises. Creditors may have
bargained not merely for going-concern value A, but also for the
greater value B that constitutes this debtor's idiosyncratic value.
In many cases, the value of assets of a business in Chapter 11 can




Here X is liquidation value, A is going-concern value, and B is an
added increment of going-concern value idiosyncratic to this
debtor.
Clearly, different persons value the same object differently. In
a perfect market, such differences are slight, but one can imagine
many markets for businesses where the variations would be great
and where the debtor might value certain assets at considerably
more than the market would. An obvious example is the debtor's
value65 in a homestead that may have been in the debtor's family
for generations. Personal attachment to the land may cause the
farmer to value the land at tens or hundreds of dollars an acre
more than others who have no similar attachment to ii. The same
kind of sentimental attachment is possible in small business opera-
tions, but it seems much less likely to be found where the asset is a
large commercial property or a publicly traded business. Yet, even
in the latter cases there may be idiosyncratic value arising out of
synergy, unique knowledge or expertise of the debtor, or, out of the
debtor's ignorance of other opportunities. For any one of these rea-
sons, the debtor may value the business by some increment B,
which is greater than the general going-concern value and liquida-
tion value attributed to the business by third parties.
In such cases, the creditor will argue that he has bargained for
and is entitled to this additional increment of value, B. In the typi-
cal state-law foreclosure, the debtor must pay the full value of the
debt in order to redeem. 6 Only when the creditor's full debt is
paid must the creditor return the asset. Such a rule gives the credi-
65. For cases wrestling with this very question in another context, see In re Dewsnup,
908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990); Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F. 2d 1304 (3rd
Cir. 1989); In re Lindsey, 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987).
66. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-506 (1990).
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tor both the right and the power to extract this idiosyncratic value
from the debtor.
Congress, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the
courts have all addressed the issue of a creditor's claim on debtor's
idiosyncratic value in at least three settings. The FTC has found it
an unfair trade practice for a secured creditor to take a non-
purchase-money, nonpossessory security interest in certain house-
hold goods.6 7 Section 522(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code produces a
similar result by avoiding nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money se-
curity interests, even though perfected, in certain things such as
household furnishings, the debtor's dog and trumpet, and the
wooden leg of the debtor's child. 8 Arguably, some courts are doing
the same thing by allowing debtors to use section 506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code in combination with Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to redeem their homes for far less than the value of
the mortgages. 9 Finally, of course, there is Chapter 12 on farmer
67. The pertinent FTC regulation reads:
(i) Household goods. Clothing, furniture, appliances, one radio and one televi-
sion, linens, china, crockery, kitchenware, and personal effects (including wedding
rings) of the consumer and his or her dependents, provided that the following are not
included within the scope of the term "household goods":
(1) Works of art;
(2) Electronic entertainment equipment (except one television and one radio);
(3) Items acquired as antiques; and
(4) Jewelry (except wedding rings).
16 C.F.R. § 44.2(a)(4) (1990).
68. Section 552(f) reads in full as follows:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of
a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
section, if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primar-
ily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or
the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor.
11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f) (West 1979).
69. For cases in favor of this policy, see, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
889 F.2d 1304 (3rd Cir. 1989); In re Moses, 110 Bankr. 962 (N.D. Okla. 1990); In re Brouse,
110 Bankr. 539 (D. Colo. 1990); In re Zlogar, 101 Bankr. 1 (N.D. 11. 1989); In re Tanner, 14
Bankr. 933 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
For cases denying the debtor the ability to redeem its home for less than mortgage
value, see, e.g., In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Schrum, 98 Bankr. 995
(W.D. Okla. 1989); In re McLaughlin, 92 Bankr. 913 (S.D. Cal. 1988); In re Maitland, 61
Bankr. 130 (E.D. Va. 1986).
For cases treating tangentially related issues, see In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537 (11th
Cir. 1989); In re Lindsey, 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987).
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bankruptcy, where Congress explicitly rejected the absolute prior-
ity rule. In Chapter 12, Congress made a conscious policy judgment
to deny the secured creditor a claim on the debtor's idiosyncratic
value in his farm.7"
Although it may not be obvious that creditor is claiming the
debtor's idiosyncratic value in all of these cases, I believe that ele-
ment lies at the heart of all three.- In the cases involving consumer
goods under the FTC rules and under section 522(f), the assets,
prosthetic devices, household goods and such, rarely have more
than trivial value to third parties even though they may have great
sentimental and even economic value to the debtor. Understanding
this, the creditor exerts his power by threatening to deprive the
debtor of this valuable asset even in circumstances where the cred-
itor cannot profitably dispose of it to any third party.
The same issue is at work in the 506(d) case and in the farmer
bankruptcy cases. In each of those, the debtor is seeking to retain
his homestead; in each, it is plausible that the homestead has
greater value to him than to any other party, partly for sentimen-
tal reasons and possibly for economic reasons. 71 The conscious
omission of the absolute priority rule in Chapter 12 seems directly
aimed at allowing that increment of value to rest with the debtor.
The same will be the consequence if the Third Circuit rule in Gag-
lia v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association72 is ultimately
adopted by the Supreme Court or by Congress. There, a debtor in
Chapter 7 sought to retain his home by the payment to the mort-
gagee of an amount equal to the value of the home (as found by
the court) but less than the amount of the mortgage debt. The
debtor, in such cases, discharges the additional increment of debt
as unsecured. There is a common thread in all of these, namely, a
debtor whose idiosyncratic' value exceeds "market" value. In all of
them, the creditor is deprived of that value.
The outcome in these cases could be justified on, either of two
grounds. First, one might argue that any seizure of the property
from the debtor in these cases will be inefficient, for by hypothesis
it will destroy an increment of value. As I indicate below, how the
efficiency equation comes out is subject to dispute. The second ar-
70. White, Taking from Farm Lenders and Farm Debtors: Chapter 12 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 13 J. CORP. L. 1, 14-15 (1987).
71. The farmer who has farmed a particular plot for years may value it more highly
than another person for several reasons. First, it will cost the farmer to move. If he can stay
on the land, he will avoid that expense. Second, his operation of the land may have given
him an insight about how the land is best used, which crops thrive in which parts of the
property. Of course, there may be other factors such as the synergistic relationship between
a particular plot of land and an adjoining plot also owned by the debtor.
72. 889 F.2d 1304 (3rd Cir. 1989).
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gument on behalf of the debtor is a forthright moral argument that
the creditor is too powerful and that it is unfair to allow him to use
this bare power to deprive the debtor of something that has little
or no independent value to the creditor.
While Congress and the FTC might be justified on moral
grounds in protecting the debtor's interest in his hunting dog or
his child's wooden leg, that protection cannot be justified on the
ground that such security claims are not efficacious. On the con-
trary, the judgment by Congress and the FTC rests on the proposi-
tion that such security claims are too efficacious, that they give the
secured creditor too much power.
Whatever one believes about security interests in personal
property of an individual debtor or about the debtor's farm home-
stead, I fail to see how the same moral judgment can be made in a
typical Chapter 11 case where the parties are quarreling over com-
mercial buildings, a, large or even a small business. In my view,
neither Marston,73 Greystone,74 Jartran75 nor Potter Material
76
justifies the kind of sympathetic response one sees for the individ-
ual debtor in section 522(f) and in the FTC rules. .
Nor is the efficiency argument persuasive to me. As I have ar-
gued at greater length elsewhere, 77 it seems quite plausible that de-
nying the debtor the power to grant security in the asset when he
wishes to grant it will produce an inefficiency. Being foreclosed
from granting a security interest in this idiosyncratic value, the
debtor may look for other alternatives. Because security interests
are inexpensive, the other alternatives (whether they are allowing
the debtor's daughter to be held hostage, or whether they come in
some other form) are likely to be more expensive. Failing such al-
ternatives, the creditor's obvious response is to charge a higher
price for its loan or to lend less money. In my view, therefore, the
second argument against the new value exception is unpersuasive.
I believe that creditors do bargain for the debtor's idiosyncratic
value and should be granted it.
There is yet a third increment of value for which the creditor
might bargain. This is value C; it is an alternative to and inconsis-
tent with B.
B C
73. In re Marston Enter., Inc., 13 Bankr. 514 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
74. In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 Bankr. 560 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
75. In re Jartran, 44 Bankr. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
76. In re Potter Material Serv., Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986).
77. White, supra note 70.
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This is the value to the creditor of depriving the debtor of the
asset. This value might arise out of the linkage that the creditor
sees between this transaction and others. If, for example, the credi-
tor lends to many commercial real estate operators, it may be in
his interest to have a reputation of never agreeing to a plan of re-
organization in which the debtor retains an interest. This reputa-
tion might cause the debtor to put in additional capital to stay out
of bankruptcy or to operate the property in a less risky fashion
than would otherwise be true.
Assume, for the sake of the argument, that the value to be
gained in the form of reputation with other debtors (C), combined
with the liquidation value (X) exceeds the value, that the debtor is
willing to pay for the property. Should the creditor be deprived of
this valve in bankruptcy? I do not think so. If this bargain is rou-
.tinely recognized in state law, why not respect it in reorganization?
Here some may get off the train. They might argue that allowing a
creditor to exercise its vindictive interest is repugnant even though
such exercise is economically rational when one considers the effect
on other transactions.
The debtor's argument might be made in the Jartran case in a
slightly different form. Recall that in Jartran, the principal objec-
tor to the plan was U-Haul. The plan was crammed down over U-
Haul's objection and by a finding that the new value exception had
been satisfied. In that case, U-Haul's principal motivation may
have been to stop the rehabilitation of a competitor. If one ex-
cluded any economic interest of U-Haul (beyond its direct claim
against Jartran), and assumed the destruction of the going-concern
increment, allowing U-Haul to veto the reorganization would ap-
pear inefficient because it might cause a destruction of that going-
concern value. 78 Yet, if one alters the efficiency equation to include
the value to U-Haul of business profits gained by Jartran's liquida-
tion, a veto of Jartran's reorganization and the consequent liquida-
tion of Jartran cannot be said to be inefficient if the value to U-
Haul exceeds the loss of going-concern value because of the liqui-
dation. Even here, I fail to see why the court should protect Jar-
tran from the bitter consequences of its bargain.
Since increment B (the idiosyncratic value of the debtor) is
known only to the debtor, and increment C (the strategic value to
the creditor of depriving this debtor the business if he does not
pay in full) is known only to the creditor, one can give the creditor
a claim on those values only by rejecting the new value exception
78. Note that it is not necessary that such an outcome would destroy the going-con-
cern value because secured creditors in that case might well have purchased the company
and continued the operation.
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to the absolute priority rule. Only by allowing the creditors to ne-
gotiate directly with the debtor will one be able to find the debtor's
value B. Only by leaving it at the exclusive judgment of the credi-
tor to decide whether to sell can one be sure that the value to the
creditor in depriving the debtor of ownership will be realized. Be-
cause it makes possible the unilateral imposition of a plan in a
"cramdown," the new value exception frees the debtor from the
necessity of getting the creditors' agreement, and reaching a nego-
tiated agreement. Thus, if one accepts either or both of these rea-
sons as a legitimate part of the creditor and debtor bargain, he
should reject the new value exception in Chapter 11.
To view the arguments from the other side, consider now the
claims, moral and economic, that might be made on behalf of the
new value exception to the absolute priority rule. To some extent I
have considered those arguments above, but it may be useful to
articulate them in greater detail.
The moral argument was mentioned above: that the power of
the creditor should be restrained at least as it applies to idiosyn-
cratic value of the debtor that has no significant and independent
economic value to the creditor. Presumably, this is what convinced
Congress and the FTC that the creditor should not have a non-
purchase money, non-possessory security interest in the debtor's
crib, dog or in his child's wooden leg. That argument is weaker
here. Although the creditor is claiming the idiosyncratic value of
the debtor, a priori, that claim is less offensive in the business than
the consumer context.
By hypothesis, the idiosyncratic value of the debtor cannot be
transferred to another and must therefore benefit the creditor only
because the threat of destruction of that value causes the debtor to
pay all or most of it to the threatening creditor. It is a common
negotiating technique - and a generally permissible one - to
threaten one's opponent with an act that will not directly benefit
the threatener except insofar as it changes the behavior of the per-
son threatened. Section 176 of the Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts (Second) makes such a threat improper where the
threatened act would harm the recipient and would not benefit the
party making the threat only if the resulting exchange "is not on
fair terms. ,7 There is nothing unfair about full payment of a cred-
79. Section 176 provides:
When a Threat Is Improper
(1) A threat is improper if
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would be a crime or
a tort if it resulted in obtaining property,
(b) what is threatened is a criminal prosecution,
(c) what is threatened is the use of civil process and the threat is made in bad
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itor's debt; thus, this case would not fall within 176(b). I conclude
that whatever moral opprobrium attaches to the creditor's use of
the debtor's attachment to the old homestead in Chapter 12, or his
baby's crib under 522(f) and the FTC rules, no similar opprobrium
attaches to depriving the debtor of his interest in a business or in a
piece of commercial property where for some reason the debtor
values that property more highly than others.
The second moral objection to rejecting the new value excep-
tion arises from completely different considerations. This is the ar-
gument that it is unfair to deny a right to the debtor to bid for the
company at a time when others would be free to make an identical
bid and conceivably to buy the company at that price. It is a kind
of equal protection argument, an argument that it is morally inap-
propriate to make the debtor into a pariah. The response is the
classic response to any equal protection argument: the two parties
are not similarly situated. The reason to foreclose the debtor's bid
is that the debtor is in a different position than a third party bid-
der. In the first place, the debtor is the one who is running the
Chapter 11 and who has the opportunity to manipulate it. There-
fore, the creditors need protection against this debtor that they do
not need against third parties. Second, because of the debtor's
knowledge of the business, the debtor is more likely to be able to
understand where the benefit lies, to hide the appearance of that
benefit and so to profit.
Finally, of course, one might argue that the debtor should be
denied certain rights granted a third party on the ground that the
debtor was at the steering wheel when the car careened into Chap-
ter 11. Whether one accepts this latter argument, it seems to me
that the equal protection argument is unpersuasive and that the
debtor is in a sufficiently different position to justify quite differ-
ent treatment of the debtor and of third parties.
In my view, the moral arguments that might be made to sup-
port the new value exception are not persuasive. This is not a case
where the creditor is wielding excessive power, nor can the debtor
make himself appear to be a victim of unjustified discrimination.
The -more powerful and obvious argument for the new value
faith, or
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a
contract with the recipient.
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly ben-
efit the party making the threat,
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is sig-
nificantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (1982).
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exception is the same argument that justifies all of Chapter 11:
only through reorganization (here read "the new value exception")
can one save the going-concern value that would otherwise be de-
stroyed in the individualistic frenzy of the hungry creditors. In
some cases there is an asset, the going-concern value, that can be
preserved only by the new value exception and that would be de-
stroyed by a strict application of the absolute priority rule. To at-
tack that argument as a basis for Chapter 11 is a job for another
day. Restricting oneself to the new value exception, I would argue
that the argument does not justify the exception.
First, consider how the new value exception might facilitate
reorganization and so preserve going-concern value that would oth-
erwise be destroyed. To begin with, the debtor might be the high-
est bidder for the asset and if the debtor is foreclosed from bid-
ding, this final increment of value will be lost. Secondly, the most
favorable possible reorganization might be foreclosed by the abso-
lute priority rule if an intermediate creditor class can veto it, even
though that class would get nothing either in liquidation or in reor-
ganization. Such a class might object to a plan (proposed jointly by
the debtor and senior creditors) in order to earn a bribe. Assume a
case in which the liquidation value of the company is $100 million,
the going-concern value is $120 million, and the senior secured
debt is $150 million. If another $50 million of unsecured debt lies
between the shareholders and the secured creditors and if the se-
cured creditors wish the shareholders to operate the reorganized
company, such a reorganization might be forestalled by the veto of
the unsecured creditors, even though those creditors have no claim
either on a liquidation or on the going-concern value of the
business.
A final way in which the new value exception might allow reor-
ganizations that would not otherwise occur can be illustrated by
Jartran. In that case, Frank B. Hall purchased the shares and im-
mediately put the company into bankruptcy. Hall ran the company
and negotiated plans for three years. It ultimately caused a plan to
be accepted in which Hall was the principal owner of the company.
Presumably, Frank B. Hall's incentive for devoting the time, effort,
and money to the operation and reorganization was that it hoped
to reap a significant profit in the form of greatly appreciated value
of the company. If no similar mode of payment could be devised
for someone to operate the company and put it back on its feet,
and if any trustee appointed by the court or the creditors would
necessarily .run it into the ground (as seems to have been the rou-
tine practice in Chapter X prior to the enactment of the 1978
Code), the new value exception would have saved an asset other-
wise to be lost.
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Note how speculative are these prospects of efficiency gains. In
the first place, each assumes a going-concern value that is greater
than the liquidation value. Often there is no going-concern value;
too frequently liquidation value exceeds going-concern value.80 For
example, consider Eastern Airlines, a company that has been in
bankruptcy as this is written for approximately two years. Initially,
the debtor in possession thought it possible to pay the Eastern
creditors in full."1 Recent news reports indicate that the creditors
will be paid far less than that; the airline has run at a loss continu-
ously since it entered Chapter 11.2 Surely the scars on creditors in
that case tell that continued operation in Chapter 11 produced an
inefficiency, not the reverse, and that then, now, and probably al-
ways, the liquidation value of Eastern Airlines exceeded its going-
concern value. If one is going to calculate the efficiency gains from
a continued Chapter 11 made possible by a new value exception,
one should also subtract the losses made possible by continued op-
eration under the shadow of the new value exception.
Second, it is not obvious that the only possibilities in cases
like Jartran are operation by competent debtor versus an incom-
petent trustee. There is no obvious structural or legal inhibition
upon the appointment of a competent trustee to run the business,
who might leave it to others to negotiate a plan. Nor is it proven
that the debtor must be given a large prize to stimulate him to
operate the company."
The Jartran example also shows that the threat of an interme-
diate creditor without any valid claim can be met by other means.
Frank B. Hall, the purchasing debtor, could have bought the se-
cured creditors' position, could then have proposed a plan, and af-
ter the plan had been approved, made whatever contractual ar-
rangement it wished to make with the existing debtor to operate
the company. Payments in such a transaction to the debtor-opera-
tors could come in the form of salary, options, or even in stock of
the reorganized company after the plan had been confirmed. Even
80. Although the statistics on the cost of Chapter 11 are few and far between, it is
plain that operating a company in Chapter 11 brings many deadweight costs attributable
only to the operation in Chapter 11 in the form of lawyers' fees, investment bankers' fees
and accountants' fees. If, by hypothesis, these are companies with modest going-concern
value, why should one assume that the going-concern value will always or even normally
exceed the Chapter 11 costs?
81. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1990, at A3, col. 4.
82. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 22, 1991, at B3, col. 1.
83. Note that if Frank B. Hall wished to purchase the company, it could easily have
purchased the secured creditor's position and, when the exclusivity period ended, could
have proposed its own plan that would have left it as the purchaser of the company. Indeed,
if the new value exception were not recognized, it would not be in the debtor's interest to
fight so bitterly to maintain its exclusivity position.
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under the current Chapter 11 regime, it seems unlikely that the
new value exception is the only way to forestall an intermediate
creditor holdup.
In the end, I find neither moral nor efficiency arguments for
the new value exception persuasive. Although it is conceivable that
a rejection of the new value exception will mean that the most effi-
cient plan will not be achieved in some cases, that cannot be shown
to be true. It is also possible that no efficiency will be lost by the
rejection of the new value exception and that the parties will find a
way to preserve any going-concern value in all cases by agreement
and without resort to that exception. If one is willing to add the
efficiency gains that arise out of a grant of security in the idiosyn-
cratic value (B) and in strategic value (C), it seems more probable
than not that abolition of the new value exception will enhance,
not diminish, the efficiency of the most probable plans.
Once one takes even a small step beyond the consumer and his
wooden leg, the moral arguments leave me unmoved. Believing as I
do that the law should allow parties to make their own deals and
should respect those deals, I think the burden of persuasion is on
those who would impose the new value exception on the parties
despite their contrary agreement. Lacking empirical data to sup-
port the debtor's efficiency argument, and being unmoved by the
moral arguments, I would conclude that new value as a rule of law
should be rejected and that the parties should be free to negotiate
whatever deal they wish. Where we see people willingly entering
into security agreements, knowing the price of state-law conse-
quences and apparently embracing them, I believe a prima facie
case has been made for the efficiency of such agreements and for
their, morality. For all of these reasons, I believe a court should
conclude that the new value exception has failed to survive the
1978 Code and to deny plans based upon that exception.
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